Établir les prix des oeuvres protégées par le droit d'auteur de manière à assurer aux créateurs une rémunéra tion concurrentielle a toujours été une tâche difficile, étant donné le caractère de biens d'information de ces oeuvres. L'exercice à l'ère du numérique est encore plus ardu. L'étude de la radio hertzienne, la radio par satellite et les services de musique interactive amène l'auteur à conclure que les redevances annuelles dans le domaine de la radio hertzienne devraient être haussées de 100 à 450 millions de dollars. Il affirme en outre que cet écart devrait être comblé non pas uniquement par les utilisateurs primaires, mais par un ensemble plus large de bénéficiaires, y compris le grand public et l'État.
Introduction
There is currently an important debate among both academics and professional practitioners on the proper definition, coverage, and characterization of intellectual property rights of all kinds: patents, copyrights, trade marks, and so forth. In many jurisdictions, the legal foundations and enforcement of intellectual property rights are being questioned and reconsidered in the con text of the digital era. New laws and extensive revisions of existing laws are discussed with powerful political and business groups on all sides of the debate.
At the centre of such debates, one finds arguments about the costs and benefits of protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights. The balance of costs and benefits is seen differently by different actors. Some see the costs of such policies, in terms of a lower dissemination of creations and innovations and therefore a loss of socio economic value and in part in terms of further creations and innovations, as larger than the benefits. Others see those benefits, in terms of adequate protection of intel lectual property rights, allowing proper compensation of creators and innovators and thereby inducing them to increase their valuable and significant but risky invest ments in the production or expression of creations and innovations, as overshadowing costs.
Clearly, intellectual property rights should not be an undue impediment to further creations and innovations; therefore, they should be properly defined and restricted in time and scope. Creations and innovations do not fall from heaven but are the result of significant efforts exerted and risks taken by creators and innovators. The balancing act here is to provide sufficient incentive for creators and innovators and at the same time foster the dissemination of creations and innovations. This is where market and marketlike institutions for transactions involving intel lectual property rights, including fair use-fair dealing exceptions, compulsory licensing, and administrative boards and tribunals acting as social welfare maximizers or market surrogates, can play a major role. 1 The recorded music and book publishing industries are particularly important in the digital economy. Music is in a sense leading the digital transition and fuels the Internet. First, recorded music and books are prone to digitization. Second, new technologies used to sell and distribute music and books on the Internet (webcasting and on-demand streaming, e-books) raise the possibility of valuable large-scale dissemination and customization at relatively low marginal costs. Third, those technologies open music and book markets to increased intensity of competition because of the lower costs of entry for creators (authors, composers, performers, writers) worldwide and from both the past and the present.
Before the advent of digitization, music and books were information assets whose distribution costs were significant; those costs are now reduced to almost zero. Marginal distribution or dissemination costs were pos sibly sufficiently high to allow profits over variable costs to cover the cost of creation through royalties. This is no longer the case.
The digital revolution comes at a time when the value of copyrighted works appears to be both signifi cantly underestimated and continuously eroded by new copyright exceptions. Active users' groups claim that a reduction in copyright price, scope, and duration would favour an increase in social and economic welfare as well as a more intensive and extensive development of innova tions and creations.
Those technological developments have made it increasingly difficult to affirm and enforce traditional in tellectual property rights.
2 Moreover, they raise new risks of copyright erosion and non-competitive compensation of creators, which I consider unfair. In Boyer (2017c) , I tackle the determination of the competitive market value of copyrighted music. I argue that in the case of Canadian Hertzian radio (HR) annual royalties should be increased from $100 million to $450 million and furthermore that this gap should not be filled by primary users alone but by a broader set of beneficiaries-the elephant in the roomincluding the general public as represented by government.
Significant challenges pave the way to copyright re forms aimed at reaping the benefits of digital technologies while protecting creators. Although the challenges and pitfalls are similar for both literary works and musical works, the rest of this article mainly deals with music. Most of it, however, can be read mutatis mutandis with literary works or patents, scientific contributions, and innovations in mind.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The "Copyright and the New Digital Economy" section presents an overview of what the new digital economy means for copyright: the recent market trends, the ques tions that an economic research program should address, and the recent debates and projects of reforms currently on the table, including recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada, which for better or worse will shape the future financials of the copyrighted works industries. The following section discusses the Gordian knot that copyright pricing represents as a quasi-unsolvable conflict between first-best and second-best principles with numerous chal lenges and pitfalls. The conflict rests in good part on the difficulty of empirically characterizing in theory and meas ure the competitive market value of copyright, which is tackled in the "Search for the Competitive Market Value of Music" section, given the digitization of musical works and sound recordings and the information good or asset feature of copyrighted works. Comparing the competitive market value of copyright and the overall compensation of rights holders on different music distribution platforms leads to the observation that a significant gap exists between the two. The "Missing Royalties" section raises the question of missing royalties and proposes an approach to fill the gap in an appropriate way. The "Conclusion" section then recalls and summarizes the main policy messages.
copyright and the new Digital economy
As the debate over the re-examination of copyright legal foundations and enforcement, coverage, exceptions, and compensation takes place, the market or markets of music delivery are changing rapidly. Beard et al. (2017, 2) However, US radio listening hours in 2016 were still accounted for mostly by traditional radio, Hertzian (79 per cent) and satellite (8 percent), with webcaster Pandora coming in at 10 percent. Regarding US music streaming hours, Pandora leads with 55 percent, followed by Spotify with 32 percent (Pandora 2016) . On a worldwide scale, Pan dora and Spotify appear to be neck and neck. As a whole, music represents 79 percent of audio listening time (Edison Research 2016) . Also, 61 percent of Americans say that they discover music through radio (AM/FM and satellite), compared with 27 percent who discover it through online audio or video streaming websites or apps (Nielsen 2015) .
Interlocking financial arrangements are also develop ing. Major music labels acquired minority stockholder positions in Spotify, namely Sony BMG (5.8 percent), Universal Music (4.8 percent), Warner Music (3.8 percent), EMI (1.9 percent), and Merlin (1.7 percent; Music Business Worldwide 2018). Moreover, it was announced on 9 June 2017 that SiriusXM invested $US480 million for a 19 per cent stake in Pandora and obtained three seats on its board of directors (Roettgers 2017) . Rights holders organizations are also active on this front. It was recently announced that US-based SoundExchange acquired the Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency. This acquisition will provide SoundExchange, a sound recording collective present in the digital world, with an opportunity to enter the music publishing administration market. The trans action comes at a time of increasing consolidation in the marketplace-another example of the changing market. These are the most recent among other cross-ownership deals that existed in the recent past and exist today.
Such financial deals in a sense blur the lines between different business models in the music delivery industry, and it is not clear how they will affect the intensity of competition among the different (digital) technologies and business models, hence the copyright royalties. But one thing is clear: unless rights holders can avoid the risky position of residual claimants in the development of the digital age, they will end up on the losing side of history.
With these trends as background, the digital era can be defined as encompassing drastic innovations in the production and distribution or dissemination technologies as well as in business organizational governance associ ated with the digitization of goods and services and the digitalization of firms and businesses. Their impacts on the competitive landscape of markets, in particular markets for intellectual property products such as copyrighted musical works, is of major importance. All current and past musical works of the world are increasingly becoming available to all at a low if not zero marginal dissemination cost.
The significant reduction in dissemination costs of music poses important challenges for the delicate bal ance between the creators' right to fair or competitive compensation or share of the market value of their works and the users' right to the benefits of digital technologies. The situation is made even more challenging because musical works are information goods: once produced, each unit can be consumed by all, because one person's use (listening or reading) of a work does not prevent its simultaneous or subsequent use by others. Moreover, musical works are assets that survive indefinitely with practically no physical depreciation. Hence, they are better referred to as information assets.
Although related, the information asset character of musical works and sound recordings and the digitiza tion of music are two different factors. The first relates to the permanence of the product or asset because one's consumption of a unit does not destroy it, and it remains available for everyone else now and in the future, whereas the second relates to the distribution or dissemination costs of that product or asset.
Economics Program
Striking the right balance between creators' and users' rights in such a context is a difficult multifaceted endeavour. In a nutshell, musical works are costly information assets; digital technologies reduce the marginal cost of dissemina tion or distribution of works to almost zero; copyright made works excludable information assets, thereby favouring the emergence of markets and market-surrogate institutions. This excludability level may, however, have become too severe for the digital world, hence possibly less efficient at its current level and less effective than before.
The significant challenges of digitization for the valua tion and pricing of musical works and sound recordings raise the importance of economic theorists and empirical economists taking a serious look at the paradigm-changing potential that comes from large-scale digitization, digital ization, dissemination, and customization both to better understand those phenomena and to suggest adequate efficiency-prone policies. David R. Strickler (2015) , a judge on the US Copyright Royalty Board, emphasizes the judicial need for comprehensive research in copyright economics.
Indeed, two important objects of economics as a social science are, first, the analysis of static and dy namic mechanisms that can best contribute to meeting the virtually unlimited needs of human beings with the limited resources available to them and, second, the design and characterization of institutions that can imple ment or concretize those mechanisms. The appropriate welfare-generating production and distribution mech anisms and institutions will depend on the nature and characteristics of the goods and services that citizens and consumers demand or need.
The deep turmoil in the world of copyright raises numerous law and economics questions. Why are the ex ceptions of fair use and fair dealing increasing in breadth, intensity, and scope? If fairness in compensation must be based on competitive market compensation, then what is the level of competitive market compensation in the con text of information assets with quasi-zero dissemination or distribution costs? Should fair use-fair dealing provisions be compensated? If yes, by whom? What about other ex ceptions? Why not make copyrighted works royalty free? And if so, how can creators' compensation be ensured?
Recent Debates and Projects of Reforms
A recent USCO (2015) report develops a series of guiding principles and preliminary recommendations for change.
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Affirming that the time is ripe to question the existing paradigm for the licensing of musical works and sound recordings, the report addresses the concerns of songwrit ers and recording artists that they cannot make a living under the existing structure and the frustrations of music publishers and performance rights organizations that so much of their licensing activity is subject to government control and therefore constrained in the marketplace, making it difficult to innovate. As in Europe, there is a general if mixed consensus in the United States and Can ada regarding the need for reform. The consensus breaks down, however, when specific measures and changes are considered, especially if they are considered on one by one.
The USCO (2015) makes five important recommendations:
• The need to extend the public performance right in sound recordings to presently exempted terrestrial radio broadcasts; • The adoption of a unique market-based rate-setting standard, whether denominated "willing buyer-willing seller" or "fair market value," hence mimicking rates that would be negotiated in an unconstrained market, to stop the subsidization by music creators of users who seek to profit from their works; • The licensing of mechanical rights on a blanket basis bundled with performance rights, possibly under the same collectives, with an opt-out option for digital rights; • The creation of a general music rights organization to maintain a publicly accessible database of musical works and sound recordings appropriately matched to simplify and facilitate more efficient licensing; and • The regrouping of all government rate setting under the Copyright Royalty Board, hence the abolishment of rate courts currently in charge of setting rates for musical works.
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The advent and growth of digital technologies have favoured an increase in the value of musical works insofar as consumption has increased but at the same time have put more emphasis on social demands to make them more available than before. In other words, they have put more emphasis on reducing the excludability that the granting of copyright was supposed to ensure.
Such a proposed policy of making music (and books) more widely available, that is, free or at lower prices overall, begs the question of who should bear the cost of such a policy. The creators as providers of musical works and sound recordings? Alone or along with some other groups? Indeed, the cost of a public policy of enhanced dissemination of copyrighted works through lower royal ties and expanded exceptions and limitations of copyright can be expressed in terms of the compensation of creators.
Whatever the public policy pursued, it would be wrong to simply expropriate the intellectual property of rights holders without properly compensating them. Properly compensating rights holders requires ab ovo a sound understanding of the competitive market value of copyright in musical works, that is, of musical works themselves.
5
Fair use and fair dealing in copyrighted works is a central exception in the current debate. It warrants some discussion because one must properly understand and apply the present and proposed fair use-fair dealing ob jectives and provisions as well as the associated regulatory frameworks. A rigorous economic analysis is essential for that matter, because fair use-fair dealing is too important to be left to legal squabbles. 6 Following landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in 2012 and the revision of the Canadian Copy right Act (Canada 2012 ) that came into effect in November 2012, the Canadian Copyright Board began to modify previously set royalty formulas and eat away at royalties by reducing in particular the types of reproductions that could be subject to copyright tariffs. The after-the-fact approach was contested by, among others, Boyer and Cremieux (2013) , who claimed that if some selling prices of jointly produced goods are lowered, by regulation for instance, a firm in a competitive context will one way or another need to adjust its pricing and production strategies to maintain its profitability or survival while properly compensating its resources and suppliers. Boyer and Cremieux's (2013) competitive response argument implies that there is in fine no economic ration ale for modifying the overall amount of royalties paid to rights holders even in the presence of exceptions. In other words, contrary to users' claims, even if new exceptions were to impose the non-compensation of certain types of music reproductions, they would not in this framework imply a reduction in royalties for the right to reproduce recorded music.
Gordian knot of copyright Pricing and compensation in the Digital era
The most important general principles or concepts that have been present in numerous if not all decisions of the different copyright boards and authorities are the following: the economic concept of works as informa tion assets, the socio-economic efficiency criteria, the willing buyer-willing seller paradigm, the willingness to pay and the ability to pay for the rights of different users, the concept of proxy for an nonexistent price, and finally the role of the copyright boards and commissions or authorities, under different institutional settings, act ing as surrogates of competitive markets and informed negotiations (Boyer 2011) .
How can the level of production of or investment in an information asset be defined to ensure not only that the maximum well-being is provided to citizens but also that existing institutions (markets, competition, regula tions) will be able to achieve this level of production or investment? The issue is complex.
Social Efficiency: First-Best and Second-Best Policies
For many goods and services, the optimal level of con sumption is generally considered to be the level achieved when the price of the good is equal to its marginal produc tion cost, insofar as demand or total consumption of the good at this price is such that the total net surplus gener ated, defined as the total value of consumption less the total cost, is positive. Otherwise, it is better not to produce the good in question. Thus, the optimal consumption level (production, distribution, and dissemination) is either zero or equal to the level obtained under marginal cost pricing. This level corresponds to what economists call a first-best optimum, which requires that fixed costs be covered one way or another. A competitive market is generally the preferred mechanism for defining and achieving an opti mal level of production and consumption of these goods.
With information goods or assets, the problem is somewhat more difficult because the same unit (think of a musical work or sound recording) can be listened to and enjoyed many times by many different users or consum ers now and in the future because consumption does not destroy or alter the unit in question. The optimal produc tion level will therefore involve the marginal cost and the (discounted) sum of marginal values enjoyed over time by all users: as long as the former is lower than the latter, it will be welfare enhancing to produce the unit in question. Additional units should be produced as long as the sum of marginal values enjoyed over time through multiple uses by multiple users remains above the marginal cost incurred by creators as investors, hence up to the point at which the two are equal. Meeting such a condition is difficult because it implies that when the sum of marginal values is equal to marginal cost, marginal values across users will differ. 7 However, for an information good or asset whose marginal cost of distribution is quasi-zero, the optimality condition requires that the sum of users' marginal values be equal to zero, which implies that each and every user's marginal value be equal to zero. Clearly, such a price will not enable the creator, seller, or producer to generate enough revenue, in fact any revenue, to cover all the costs involved in generating and marketing the information asset, and in particular the significant fixed costs, includ ing the proper compensation for risk taking.
A competitive market, which would implement the condition "price = marginal cost = 0," cannot therefore ensure an optimal allocation of resources unless and until the compensation of the fixed costs of production or creation is achieved. With a quasi-zero price, too few individuals would be prepared to take up a career as a creator and to devote the time and resources needed to generate zero-priced information assets, such as original musical works.
In response to these problems, two streams of thought have developed. The first argues that one ought to assign property rights to creators over their created assets, in particular over the transfer or communication and repro duction of their creations, and allow markets to emerge and determine equilibrium prices, that is, prices that ensure that creators and consumers or users are satisfied with the exchange level that would thereby be achieved.
Because of the property right conferred, creators might be able to restrict access to those users who actually pay for this access. The resulting equilibrium price would be higher than the marginal cost and could make it possible to cover all of the production and distribution costs at the expense of lower than optimal consumption or use levels (second best) of the asset.
The other stream of thought argues that the strict attain ment of an optimum must be promoted with transfer and communication, reproduction, and consumption allowed at marginal cost, hence free of charge (first best). Creators should then be compensated in various ways from some combination of private sponsorship and grants, concerts with limited admission capacity hence priced above zero, and government subsidies. Each of these approaches poses problems.
Overly strict copyright provisions could give the pro ducers of the work a monopoly over the asset, or group of assets, if creators can regroup under a common roof: the price of each unit could then be too high and the number of creations distributed or disseminated too low, thereby reducing the production of new works because each new work is in some sense the indirect result of previous works: a dwarf sitting on a giant's shoulders can see much farther than the giant.
8 Loosened copyright might make it easier to stand on the shoulders of giants, but there might, however, be fewer giants.
Free use has its own set of problems. If an organization composed of private parties or governments had to fund the production of works through fixed or variable grants to creators and to that effect keep a record of every use, how could it establish the absolute and relative value of the works produced to properly compensate creators? The organization might want to control its disbursements, reduce them, or even link them to arbitrary factors, to the detriment of creators and users. Which and how many authors or creators would spend time and resources to produce quality works whose valuation depends on the goodwill and sagacity of some organization of private parties and government bureaucracies?
Combination of These Policies
Economic analysis can provide or suggest answers to these questions. The problem is complex, as Landes and Posner (1989, 326) suggested:
Copyright protection-the right of the copyright's owner to prevent others from making copies-trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.
Obviously, solutions will not be completely efficient or first-best optimal.
Three principles are at the forefront of the copyright pricing challenge:
• The competitive level-playing-field principle, which ensures that all users of musical works and sound re cordings, whether in hard or digital form, compete for customers on equal terms given the various business models characterizing the different users: same pricing for similar uses, different but compatible pricing for different uses; • The competitive market value principle, which en sures that the compensation of rights holders achieves fairness for both users and rights holders as well as efficiency and effectiveness; and • The information good pricing principle, which ensures that users can have access to if not consume all avail able musical works given that those musical works are permanent, that is, not expended in consumption.
The whole art lies in finding a solution that can be useful and be implemented at low cost while at the same time come close to an optimal allocation. The best that one can hope for would be to regulate market pricing to minimize distortions from the first-best solution, that is, to introduce appropriate distortion-minimizing wedges between prices and marginal costs to meet a budget objective, which in the present context takes the form of a competitive compensation level for creators.
The first-best solution is to price at marginal cost and find ways other than revenues generated from sales to compensate creators, because those revenues will not be sufficient to do so. The second-best solution is to introduce wedges between prices and marginal costs in the different market segments, or at different links in the chain between creators and users, in such a way that the resulting use or consumption levels will allow the proper compensa tion of creators but diverge as little as possible from the first-best solution.
This can be done through what economists call the "Ramsey inverse elasticity principle": wedges between prices and marginal costs should be inversely propor tional to the elasticity of demand, that is, higher when demand is less elastic, indicating a low reactivity of users or consumers to price increases. In this way, second-best consumption levels will remain as close to first-best levels as possible given the budget constraint.
One may also think of a combination of these two solu tions: partly first-best principled and partly second-best principled. The problem and its solutions are complex, and it is important to remember that as soon as one enters into a realm of solutions that have imperfect and incomplete information bounds or constraints placed on them, the best becomes the enemy of the good: things gets messy when you run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.
Creators' Competitive Compensation as the Budget Constraint to Be Covered
What should the creators' compensation constraint to impose on the overall pricing program be? That is another Pandora's box. The historical prices and royalty revenues effectively received by rights holders are of little help here because they were obtained and developed through self-referencing rate determination procedures and hearings, with little if any theoretically sound empirical justifications.
The competitive market value of copyrights in music is what provides the compensation constraint to be imposed on the overall pricing system. Because musical works and sound recordings are information goods or assets, the competitive market value of copyrights, hence the deter mination of relevant tariffs, rests not so much on the cost of creation, which underlies the supply function of new works and new sound recordings, but rather on the value of such goods to the users. 9 More rigorous basis and more rigorous analytical tools for ascertaining the competitive market value of copyright in copyrighted works or assets are thus needed.
Moving away from simple heuristics and traditional analysis toward sounder, more advanced economic analy sis and renewed institutional frameworks is a demanding endeavour that could be miscarried if not properly understood. The challenges and pitfalls are numerous. Besides those I discussed earlier, namely the fact that musical works and sound recordings are costly and risky information goods or assets, the fact that digitization is a drastic innovation that significantly reduces the dissemin ation costs of music, and the possibility that copyright is increasingly eroded by new exceptions and limitations, one can add the following:
1. The level of royalties being paid by users to rights holders is one concern, but the distribution of the pie among creators of different types or groups (authors, composers, music publishers, performing artists, pro ducers of sound recordings, and music labels) is also a major but different concern.
10 2. The current framework of sequentially determining royalty payments and rates, with each case being heard or negotiated on a stand-alone basis, makes it difficult for the royalty boards as well as negotiated contracts to implement significant adjustments; if all rates were to be determined at the same time, a level playing field of competition could more easily be maintained with the different rates being based on proper competitive mar ket values; making changes in a sequential fashion may prevent the unavoidable challenges of the status quo. 3. There is always a real danger of inadvertently tilting the level playing field of competition between different delivery technologies of musical works, namely trad itional, analogue, digital, and Internet technologies, all of which are competing for listeners' ears. 4. There is also a real danger of losing sight of the forest for the trees, because the big picture itself keeps evolv ing. As the USCO (2015, 3) puts it,
The Copyright Office has previously highlighted the outmoded rules for the licensing of musical works and sound recordings as an area in significant need of reform. Moreover, the Office has underscored the need for a comprehensive approach to copyright review and revision generally. This is especially true in the case of music licensing-the problems in the music marketplace need to be evaluated as a whole, rather than as isolated or individual concerns of particular stakeholders.
search for the competitive market Value of music
The competitive pricing of copyrights in such a context aims to achieve both balance and neutrality between rights holders' rights and users' rights and between business users' rights and consumers' rights, through the proper compensation of creators for the valuable assets they create, the proper compensation of business users for the costs and risks they incur, and the proper if not maximal dissemination of musical creations. Achieving such com petitive pricing requires moving away from traditional heuristics toward sounder analytics.
Indeed, the current procedures for determining roy alty payments and rates are based mainly if not totally on path-dependent heuristics and rules of thumb whose foundations in theoretical and applied economics are relatively weak and clearly inadequate to tackle the cur rent and upcoming copyright agenda.
The fundamental issues or questions before us are as follows: What is or are the competitive market value or values of copyright given the information good aspect of copyrighted works (music and books), as the advent of digitization makes the emergence of properly func tioning competitive markets difficult, even impossible? How can creators' right to fair compensation be balanced with users' right to the benefits of digital technologies at a time when the conflict between fairness and efficiency has become more acute than ever before?
The competitive market value principle, which is the very foundation of the proper or fair compensation of creators, relies on consumers' valuation of music and willingness to pay for it. However, the ways in which pay ments are made may not be the traditional ways (tariffs or per play rates). A consumers' advocate economist would say, Although we value music a lot and want to consume more of it and although we want creators and providers of such music to be properly compensated (competitive market compensation), the pricing of such music should take into account the fact that music is an information good or asset and the fact that adding consumers or enhancing dissemination of works costs almost nothing. This calls for a significant reassessment of both the way in which copyright protection has historically been understood and enforced and the channels through which creators' proper or fair compensation can be achieved. This is at best a difficult, multifaceted endeavour, whose end point solution likely lies outside the box.
Pricing copyrighted works or assets has always been a difficult task given the information good character of such works. Doing it in the digital era is even more challenging. In Boyer (2017c) , I propose an approach to characterizing the proper competitive market value of copyrights in music. The approach infers the competitive market value of copyrights in music, hence the competitive market compensation of rights holders, from the observation of the behaviour and choices made by operators of HR, satellite radio (SR; SiriusXM), and interactive music streaming services (Spotify). The approach does not rely on traditional path-dependent heuristics and rules of thumb, which represent the bulk if not the totality of current procedures to determine royalties and whose foundations in theoretical and applied economics are rela tively weak and clearly inadequate to tackle the current and upcoming challenging copyright agenda.
I stress the important link between the competitive market value of music and the ensuing fair compensation of creators, which corresponds to what would be paid in well-functioning competitive markets. A competitive equilibrium is a situation in which economic forces are balanced at a stable resting point suitable for both willing buyers (demand) and willing sellers (supply). Therefore, a competitive equilibrium price or a properly negotiated price would necessarily account for balance between creators' interests and users' interests because any investments, costs, risks, and derived benefits would be incorporated into the resulting competitive market or negotiated price.
In spite of the fact that musical works are different from standard goods such as apples or cars-they are information goods-the same fundamental principles apply. However, two possibilities arise: either users pay the same price regardless of the value they derive from the work or users pay some proportion of the value they derive from the good (Lindahl pricing). A negotiated price between sophisticated and symmetric parties is analogous to a competitive equilibrium price.
The results derived in Boyer (2017c) suggest that rights holders are significantly shortchanged and poorly served by the current copyright pricing or royalty framework, to the annual tune of billions of dollars. That result follows as a corollary from three propositions developed in Boyer (2015 Boyer ( , 2017c ):
• In HR, the competitive market values of music and talk are necessarily proportional to their shares of broadcast time. The argument is that program time is allocated by the profit maximizing operator in such a way that the last minute of music and the last minute of talk share the same marginal value. The observa tion of how much on-air personalities (talk) are paid, expressed on a per-minute basis, gives one an estimate of this same marginal value. The competitive market value of music, as revealed by the HR operator's choice of programming time allocation, is then given by this same marginal value times the program time in min utes allocated to music. The competitive value is not obtained through a market process in which creators compete among each other in selling their music but through the observation of choices made by operators.
• In SR, such as SiriusXM, the competitive market values of music and other inputs such as talk are necessarily proportional to their relative capacity to attract sub scribers. The argument is based on a comparison of the contract of radio host Howard Stern and a survey of SR subscribers' willingness to pay for music content.
• In the interactive music streaming services industry (Spotify), the competitive market value of music is the negotiated per-play rate, which includes a premium for interactivity.
Cost Structures and Royalty Formulas
Differences in cost structures, namely cost of entry and cost of audience reach, favour the existence of different royalty formulas in different industries although those industries compete with each other up to a certain point for listeners' ears. To maintain a level playing field of com petition between different technologies and industries, royalty formulas must differ. In HR and SR industries, costs of entry (broadcast ing spectrum license) and fixed costs of audience reach (broadcasting equipment) are relatively high, and mar ginal costs of audience reach are relatively low, even zero. This favours a percentage-of-revenues formula. In the music streaming or webcasting services industry, costs of entry are relatively low, and fixed and marginal costs of audience reach (bandwidth costs) are relatively high and increase with audience size. This favours a per-play rate formula.
Hence, a royalty formula expressed as a percentage of revenues through a blanket license for repertoires is socially efficient for HR and SR, and a royalty formula ex pressed as a per-play rate is socially efficient for interactive and semi-interactive music streaming and webcasting services. Per-play rates in webcasting and music streaming services allow rights holders to avoid being "residual pay ees" and favour healthy competition first by eliminating uncompetitive or inefficient webcasters who use a huge amount of recorded music with little revenue-generating capacity and second by reducing destructive competition intensity (Bertrand trap). A per-play formula thus induces webcasters, as resellers of recorded music, to develop value-added features such as interactivity (Spotify) or genomic features (Pandora).
Competitive Market Value
As mentioned earlier, I show in Boyer (2017c) that in commercial terrestrial radio or HR, the relative com petitive market values of music and talk are necessarily proportional to their respective shares of program time if the operators are maximizing their profits. Using data obtained for the Canadian context, I obtain the competitive market value of music as equal to 28 percent of revenues. As also mentioned earlier, it is socially efficient that royal ties be expressed as a percentage of revenues in HR.
I also show that for SR, the relative competitive market values of music and talk are necessarily proportional to their relative capacities to attract subscribers (Boyer 2017c ). In the case of US SR (SiriusXM), this competitive market value is also equal to 28 percent of revenues, and it is so cially efficient that royalties be expressed as a percentage of revenues in SR.
Finally, I show that for interactive online music stream ing services, the competitive market value of music corresponds to the mainly unregulated negotiated roy alty payments (per-play rate) paid by interactive music streaming services, including the premium for interactivity (Boyer 2017c ). In the case of the interactive music streaming service Spotify, this competitive market value is equal to $US0.0060 per play (or $US6.00 per 1,000 plays), and it is socially efficient that royalties in webcasting be expressed as a per-play rate.
All three competitive value estimates, qualifying as competitive market values, are obtained separately by observing the behaviour and choices of operators or pri mary users, not from value judgments. They nevertheless point to similar or compatible competitive market values. To verify whether these royalty formulas and rates satisfy the competitive level-playing-field principle, I translate them into royalty rates and payments that can be com pared with each other.
The 28 percent of revenues competitive market value of music in the Canadian HR industry can be expressed as a per-play rate as follows. Given that a play is defined as a four-minute piece listened to by one person, then given the program time (number of minutes) devoted to playing music and given the estimated audience reach, one can obtain the number of plays. Dividing the royalty payment by the estimated number of plays gives the per-play rate. The Canadian HR competitive per-play rate falls between $0.00235 per play, based on Audley and Boyer (2007) program time estimates, and $0.00324 per play, based on average program time estimates of five different reports.
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The competitive per-play rate interval can be directly compared with the competitive market value per-play rates of non-interactive or semi-interactive music stream ing services.
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To be comparable with the interactive music streaming services royalty rate, these HR rates must be adjusted up ward for the value of interactivity (+92 percent, estimated from music downloads in Boyer, Blit, and Audley 2013) , which takes us to a range of $0.0045 per play (Audley and Boyer 2007 ) to $0.0061 per play (average of the five different reports). In 2015, the interactive streaming service Spotify paid a per-play rate of $US0.0060 per play, which is some what of the same order, before adjusting for the exchange rate, which is again a rather interesting and comforting result.
In 2016, semi-interactive service Pandora paid a regu lated per-play rate of $US0.00245 per play, whereas its competitive market value per-play rate, based on the Spotify rate less the premium for interactivity, should be $US0.0031 per play. I conclude therefore that the competi tive market value of music on Pandora is somewhat of the same order as the competitive market value of music in HR (and SR), before adjusting for the exchange rate. It is a rather interesting and comforting result.
A note on YouTube (Google) may be useful here. Ac cording to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), which represents the major music companies, YouTube pays actually about $US0.001 per play in royal ties. As Cary Sherman (n.d.) , chairman and chief executive officer of RIAA, puts it, "It makes no sense that it takes a thousand on-demand streams of a song for creators to earn $1 on YouTube, while services like Apple and Spotify pay creators $7 or more for those same streams." YouTube claims, however, that it is advertising based and there fore more comparable to HR than to subscription-based interactive webcasting such as Apple Music and Spotify. Recall from the preceding discussion that the Canadian HR industry presently pays between $0.00039 per play and $0.00052 per play, whereas Apple Music pays about $US0.012 per play, Spotify $US0.006 per play, 13 and Pan dora $US0.00245 per play. Beard et al. (2017, 20) claim that using 2015 data . . . a plausible royalty rate increase [on YouTube, based on an average royalty rate between noninteractive streaming and interactive streaming rates] could produce increased royalty revenues in the U.S. of $650 million to over one billion dollars a year.
missing royalties
The implied change in royalties is significant. In the case of the Canadian HR industry, the competitive market value of music is more than 4.5 times higher than the current level of royalty payments: 28 percent versus 6 percent, or $450 million versus $100 million. In the US SR industry (Sirius XM), the competitive market value of music is 2.8 times higher than current royalty payments: 28 percent of revenues versus 10 percent, or $US1.28 billion versus $US457 million. In non-interactive webcasting (Pandora) , the competitive market value of music is about 28 percent higher than current royalty payments: $US0.00312 per play versus $US0.00245 per play, or $US937 million versus $US734 million. In all these cases, royalty rates presently paid are determined or strongly influenced by regulatory bodies, hence are neither really competitive nor really monopolistic. In the interactive music streaming industry (Spotify), it may be considered to be at the proper level ($US0.00600 per play), given the mainly unregulated ne gotiation process between users and rights holders (music labels) in that industry.
So, where are the missing values? If governments and royalty-fixing authorities (copyright boards and com missions) design and implement rules, regulations, and exceptions that significantly reduce tariffs below competi tive market values, thereby expropriating part of rights holders' assets, who should pay for such policies?
It is difficult to generalize these results across different jurisdictions because copyright structures differ across jurisdictions. However, a realistic figure of rights hold ers' undercompensation, compared with the competitive market value of their works and rights, runs into billions of dollars per year. So, how should the shortfall be filled, and who should fill it?
Economics of Public Policy toward Culture: The Elephant in the Room
The fundamental element of a public policy toward cul ture insofar as compensation of creators is concerned is to identify different royalty mechanisms (rates, percentages, prices, grants, bases) to ensure maximal dissemination of copyrighted works or assets while ensuring fair and equitable, that is, competitive, compensation of creators. Such an approach combines first-best and second-best mechanisms.
Because it is difficult and possibly non-efficient and non-optimal to charge end consumers directly for the music they consume given the information good character of musical works and sound recordings and the significant value-generating properties of digital technologies through low-cost dissemination and customization, other comple mentary ways must be found to compensate rights holders for the competitive market value of their works as assets.
It might be useful here to recall that in the context of public policies toward educational services, there is a clear separation between the pricing of services to end users, the students and their parents, and the compensation of educational services or content providers, namely teachers and administrators and other personnel who are arguably compensated at their competitive market value.
Similarly, in public policies toward health care, there is a clear separation between what end consumers, the pa tients, pay and what the providers of health care services or content, namely doctors, nurses, administrators, and other personnel, are receiving as compensation, which arguably corresponds to their competitive market value.
Another means to achieve the competitive market compensation of creators might be to bring all "benefici aries" (primary users [HR, SR, and online music services], Internet service providers, equipment manufacturers, end consumers, and governments) into one class or group of stakeholders and to make that group as a whole jointly and severally responsible for ensuring the proper competi tive market compensation of creators. Those beneficiaries would be responsible for finding a sharing formula to determine their respective contributions and to foot the bill, a complex but feasible endeavour.
Although it may seem far-fetched at first, this chain of beneficiaries represents in a way the elephant in the room. That is a difficult problem that has never properly been addressed. Its analysis and solution could make use of cooperative game theory. The current standard analytical framework considers only two stakeholders, creators and primary users. A more appropriate analytical framework could be a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, only two stakeholders' groups would be considered: creators on one side and a single group of users or beneficiaries on the other. In the second step, the latter group would be disaggregated into several beneficiaries responsible for honouring the liabilities of the single group of users in the first stage. The two-step formulation appears to be a less complex approach to rein in the elephant.
conclusion
A solution to the Gordian knot of balancing the fair and equitable, that is, competitive compensation of creators and rights holders' rights and users' rights to the benefits of digitization of music, properly recognizing the infor mation asset characteristics of musical works and sound recordings, can be achieved. The competitive market value of copyrights in music and the program proposed to imple ment such value are properly grounded in the economics of efficient allocation of resources, efficient negotiation and mediation, and cooperative game theory. This article sets the table in meeting the significant challenge to develop the proper theoretical argument and to write it in a userfriendly and convincing way for all stakeholders.
The sought-after solution to this Gordian knot would involve the design of tariffs or contributions imposed at different stages of the value chain between creators and end consumers, hence on different beneficiaries of copy righted musical assets, those beneficiaries being once again the direct users, Internet service providers, equipment manufacturers, and end consumers and their governments as their collectives. The challenge is significant because a proper competitive compensation of creators may require increasing royalties. I argue in Boyer (2017c) that the com petitive market value of copyrighted music in Canadian HR is of the order of $450 million per year compared with the current payment level of $100 million.
Therefore, it may not be impossible to implement a solution that balances rights holders' interests and users' interests with different sources of payments to rights holders, namely the primary users, other benefactors, and governments as collectives of end consumers. If indeed music fuels the Internet and is leading the digital transi tion, implementing such a program is urgently needed. and the USCO (2015) , and I present the main characteris tics of music copyright structures in different jurisdictions. Malka (2015) lists 21 planned "compulsory" exceptions to European Union copyright law. If enacted, they would seri ously undermine the capacity of the book publishing indus try to pay fair compensation to authors and creators. One of those exceptions, for instance, would allow libraries to lend e-books with no limit on time or number, a serious threat of cannibalization of book and e-book sales and possibly of royalties. 4 See Boyer (2017a, Appendix) for a brief survey of the differ ent institutional frameworks in different jurisdictions. 5 Michele Boldrin and David Levine (2008) make a case against the institution of copyright itself. This is not the place for a critique of their work. However, I differ by be ginning from a perspective that government is obligated to enforce a creator's natural right against unauthorized dis tribution, copying, and reuse of her or his creation. Copy right is a complex institution that can only be understood as a second-best policy outcome. 6 For a comparative analysis of fair use in the United States and fair dealing in the United Kingdom and Canada, see D'Agostino (2008) . I proposed in Boyer (2012) an economic analysis of the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada (CCH Canadian Ltd. cited to SCR). 7 Achieving the optimality condition through decentralized decision making by individual users would, for instance, require different prices for different users to induce them to consume the proper quantity, each user thereby facing his or her own particular price (Lindhal equilibrium). The sum of those individualized prices must then be sufficient to cover the marginal cost of production. 8 John of Salisbury ([1159] 1955, 167) writes, "Bernard of Chartres used to compare us to dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature." 9 The Canadian Copyright Board (2002, 8) 
recognized, in its
Pay Audio Decision, that "in information industries, pricing tends to be based on the value to the buyer, not on cost to produce." 10 Suzanne Combo (2017) of Guilde des Artistes de la Musique (an association created in March 2013 in Paris to bring to gether the community of authors, composers, and perform ers as a single collective voice aiming to be a source of pro posals to national and European public authorities, cultural institutions, and professional bodies to effectively promote the interests of music artists in the digital age) wrote in Le Monde-Éco & Entreprise, "The big winners of streaming re main the majors. The contracts of the artists, all confidential and varying according to their notoriety, are not adapted because they are modeled on the old model of the sale of records. . . . The contract provides for the artist from 10 per cent to 12 percent of net sums cashed by the producer. . . . The pie remains opaque and doubtful since the producer no longer has storage or manufacturing costs, as for a CD. In addition, the artist finances part of the promotion. So in the end, he often does not touch more than 5 percent . . . of the deals between majors and platforms, the former being minority shareholders of the latter. . . . As a whole, artists are unaware of the content of exchanges between labels, producers and streaming companies." 11 These estimates include the following share of music and talk in program time obtained through different method ologies applied to different periods, different contexts, and different samples: 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, in Globerman (2007) 
